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I n the beginning of the nineties, already more than two decades separate us from the discussion about whether history should remain an objective 
chronicle of political treaties, great battles and famous personalities or whether 
it should direct its interest toward a kind of structural analysis of historical 
processes. Like Paul Veyne, the contemporary historians don’t go after only 
mere facts, but -  answering, for example, the question of who were the 
favorites of Louis 13th -  try to find out what this is at all -  a favorite. The 
extent to which this decision is or is not just a matter of principle is of course 
another question to leave aside here. However we can undoubtedly state that 
there are only a few historians left nowadays who still think aloud about the 
objectivity in the way the German classical historiographical school did. We 
are faced, though, with a totally different problem: that we still come across 
chroniclers who theoretically claim to agree with the principles of the new 
historiography, but who in concrete work avoid attempting an interpretation 
of their own wherever it is possible, usually avoiding theoretical self-reflection 
of their science. Moreso, until not long ago they despised it as something that 
doesn’t belong in the historian’s sphere of work Nowadays their unexpressed 
positions are still seen to exert influence, especially on their frightened 
students, who, in abundance of dates learnt by heart, are forced to guess 
whether Rudolf the Habsburg was really elected to be the German king in 
1274 -  or was it perhaps a year later or before?
In short, the initiative for a different view of the nature of historical
explanation, and thus the creative contribution to the development of 
historiography, is to be sought elsewhere, by those authors who -  following 
Humboldt -  make distinction between (or join) historical research as 
mediation betwen empirical statements about what happened in the past and 
historiography, which only gives meaning to these events and thus constitutes 
them as history. Within this frame we can place the »grandfathers« (Febvre, 
Bloch) and »fathers« (Braudel) of the new historiography, as well as all 
younger authors who try to answer the question what is and what is not history 
by analysing the forms of historical representation. Thereby, as already noted, 
they proceed from distinction between the real (or material) notion of 
»history« i.e. the notion that refers to the subject of historical research, and
between the theoretical (or formal) expression which is, on the contrary,
194 Oto Luthar
defined by activity concerning the given object, that is to say, by the ways of 
interpretation of the past.
Within such a theoretical and philosophical frame we are therefore interested 
mostly in those authors who tackled the problem of historical representation 
by opening the question of narrative in contemporary historical theory. By 
analysing their theories we would like to point at the scope of a similar 
discussion within Slovene theoretical reflection of historiography.
*
In contemporary historical theory, the topic of narrative has been the subject 
of extraordinarily intense debate. Viewed from one perspective, this is 
surprising; on the face of it, there should be very little to debate about 
narrative. Narration is a manner of speaking as universal as language itself, 
and narrative is a mode of verbal representation so seemingly natural to 
human consciousness that to suggest that it is a problem might well appear 
pedantic.1
If the position quoted above -  expressed in the middle of the eighties by 
Hayden White, who wanted, referring to Barth, to substantiate his 
conceptualization of contemporary historical narration -  is now to a great 
extent already acknowledged, then, the process of this acknowledgment wasn’t 
a very simple one. The authors who undertook such a rehabilitation, or to be 
more precise, such an analysis of narration, until as long as three decades ago 
didn’t come across -  save a few exceptions -  to many listeners and 
sympathizers. The later advocates of narrative conception -  White being here 
a big exception -  also often overlooked the meaning and the position of some 
»classics«, i.e., pioneers in the contemporary theory of historiography. Even 
rarer were those who included Croce in their »genealogy« from Gervinus up to 
Danto, although precisely Croce in his »genial confusion or confused genius« 
was the first to draw the distinction between »theory of historiography« and 
»philosophy of history«, proceeding from the standpoint that the basic 
questions of the theory of historiography belong in the sphere of aesthetics.2
1. Hayden White, »The Question of Narrative in Contemporary Historical Theory«, XXIII/1, 
1984, p. 1. Reprinted in: Hayden White, The Content o f the Form. Narrative Discours and 
Historical Representation, John Hopkins Univ. Press, Baltimore -  London 1987. Slovene 
translation in: Oto Luthar (ed.), Vsi Tukididovi možje. Sodobne teorije zgodovinopisja, 
Ljubljana 1990.
2 . Resumed from: Hayden White, Auch Klio D ichtet oder Fiktion des Faktischen: Studien zur 
Tropologie d. histor. Diskurses, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 1986, p. 259, where Croce, in a 
quotation of White, concludes his comprehension of aesthetics with the following thoughts: 
»In case aesthetics is a pure intuitional science... then we perceive it as philosophy as art; but 
as soon as it wants to be a theory of a special group of intuitions (intuitions the subject of 
which is some particular reality), then it appears in front o f us as theory of historiography 
which doesn’t meditate about what should have happened in a certain time and in a certain 
place, but just gets acquanted with what happens in the society in general.« (p. 263).
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In this regard, it is almost inevitable, before sketching up the up-to-date 
discussion on the subject of narrative discourse and historical representation, 
to present at least those views of Croce enabled this topic at all (or at least 
made the way to it easier). What we have in mind, first of all, are certain 
questions concerning his synthesis of evidence and criticism.
Stimulated by Vico’s equation of philosophy with science and history, Croce 
substantiated his distinction between theory of historiography and philosophy 
of history with the argument that the former is supposed to form the criteria 
by which the historians would shape and unify their narrations, as well as give 
them adequate contents, while the latter should, in his opinion, tend toward 
discovering seemingly general rules, on the basis of which human acts can be 
displayed in the forms they had adopted on different places in different times.
According to this, he was convinced that the theory of historiography is 
justified only in cases when we have to deal with intuitional -  and not also 
with notional -  logic, that is to say, in cases when it is clearly defined that the 
activity of historiography is to be placed within the frame of art. In view of 
this, he strictly separated poetical history, as well as chronicle and practically 
oriented, i.e., »oratorical« or »rhetorical« history from philological history.
His criticism, however, didn’t aim only at poetical history, but also at 
derivation of all representation forms within romantic historiography, as well 
as at all later forms of historical representation that treated the sources 
(»reports« and »documents«) merely as assistant means of historical 
cognition.3 On the other hand, it is also true that his deepest interest was 
precisely the analysis of socalled »poetics«, for he kept repeating that insofar 
as we consider human history to be a history of mind and agree to the mind 
being a value that can be understood, then it is clear that history is always a 
history of values. But since in the »historiographical perception the mind is 
recognizable as thought, then the latter appears as the basic value of 
historiography. The defining principle of history therefore cannot be the so 
called ’sensual value’«, since the latter is life and not thought. Insofar as this 
»on the part of mind not yet reflected life finds a way to express itself, then 
we have to deal with a poem and not with history.« If we therefore want to 
change a poetical biography into a historical one, »we must keep our ...
3 . In the first chapter of his book Z ur Theorie und Geschichte der Historiographie (Mohr, 
Tübingen 1915, p. 24-25), Croce -  counting up the representatives of poetical historiography 
(from Herodot up to Mommsen) and introducing numerous cases of such historiography 
offered to us in enthusiastic biographies of popular and respected persons and satirical 
accounts of the unpopular ones, as well as in patriotic stories that praise the successes and 
accuse the failures of a nation, etc, points to the fact that »poetical history cannot be 
exhausted in such a fundamental and abstract unison of love and hatred (hatred that is love 
and love that is hatred), but slips through the most complicated forms and the finest devious 
ways of feeling and appears in front of us as a trustful, loving, melancholic, yearning, 
pessimistic, resigned, cheerful... poetical history.«
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dreams, love and contempt for ourselves and ask for the merits which place 
the individual whose life we want to show into the frame of social and 
civilizational activity«.4 In short, he felt sure that when writing history we 
must overcome sensual values and modify them into mental values, for in the 
opposite case, »when we cannot rise up to this ’subjectivity’, the result of our 
work will not be history, but poetry: and the problem of history will remain 
untouched«.3
History, says Croce, has only one duty: to unfold the facts. What we therefore 
refer to as the search for reasons of these facts, is merely a »more careful 
analysis and understanding of individual relations among them.« In his 
opinion, taking into account the claim for »a new form of history,« the history 
or historiography should be reformed totally or not at all. Here, of course, we 
have to deal with two levels of reflection. From the »abstract« point of view, 
says Croce, the tendency towards a kind of »real history« is unjustified: »the 
history is and will always be the same; that is to say, the living history or 
history of (ideal) past, as well as the chronicle, the philological, poetical and 
practically oriented history are, have been and shall always be the same«. It 
turns out that those who wanted to »thoroughly reform« history could never 
avoid confrontation between philological and poetical history (and vice versa), 
unless they opposed both of them to the »contemporary« history. But such an 
undertaking usually doesn’t turn out well, therefore -  proceeds Croce -  some 
historians as well as some »dull sociologists and positivists« on the edge of the 
century, with a lot of noise but a poor knowledge of the essence of history, 
regretted the fact (if, of course, they managed to realize it at all) that history 
cannot be subjected to the methodological grips (abstraction, observation, 
experiment) of natural sciences.6
The changes in history, i.e., historiography, should therefore be undertaken 
concretely. If we look at history from a concrete point of view, thinks Croce, 
then we are to reform just about everything within its frame, which means that 
history should constantly be elaborated, enriched and deepened, as well as that 
»there’s no history that could satisfy us entirely.« »Every construction of ours 
indeed does reveal new facts and raises new questions..., but«, and this is the 
point he firmly insisted on, »history always reforms itself alone and remains 
nevertheless always the same; last but not least, it is precisely this persistence 
of it wherein the power of its development is hidden«.7
His criticism of the socalled reformers, therefore, doesn’t signify that, like 
Windelband, he understood history as a merely descriptive science. On the 
contrary, in a controversy with Windelband Croce argued that »description« is
4 . B. Croce, Z u r Theorie der G esch ich tep. 26.
5. Ibid
6 . Ibid., p. 35-36.
7 . Ibid., p. 36.
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undoubtedly an adequate expression for analysis and generalization of 
description of the subject of empirical research. But if description means what 
we imagine under this notion in history, then the notion »descriptive science« 
is contradictio in adiecto. A historian doesn’t treat facts as a mere reflection of 
general laws, but »thinks« about his subject. And this is precisely what the 
artist does as well. Therefore -  proceeds Croce -  the »comparison« (most 
clearly articulated by Dilthey) »between history and art is perfectly justified.«8
Although some authors, with Collingwood at the head, share the opinion that 
Croce in his early works spent too much effort trying to justify and ground the 
connection of history and art, we still think that such views nevertheless 
signify an important step ahead of the unappealable German positions in the 
second half of the 19th century. Although German historians have, like later 
Croce, considered the distinction between the individual and the universal as 
the key to distinguishing history from science, they still kept thinking of 
history as science, without answering the question of how a science about the 
individual is possible at all. This was mostly due to Windelband’s distinction 
between nomothetical science (oriented into formation of general laws) and 
ideographical science, where history also should belong, her duty being simply 
to describe facts. W hat’s more, by adopting this distinction without further 
reflection, many historians (also outside German borders) even decades later 
still successfully rejected reproaches on account of their modest possibilities 
concerning the theoretical reflection of the historian’s work.
But this is already another story. The important thing for us is that with the 
criticism of Croce’s views, the discussion about the relation between art and 
history got a certain continuity. A nice example of this offers us the 
well-known booklet of Hughes, History as A r t and as Science,9 where the 
author promoted »sensibility« as the manner of author’s engagement in 
creating historical science and argued for the theory that »in writing his report, 
the historian should act like a dramatist.«10 Most important, however, is the
8 . In this connection, Robin G. Collingwood ( The Idea o f History, Clarendon Press 1946, Part 
IV) already points out, not without reason, that in his comprehension of relation between 
history and art Croce has gone too far into another extreme, since both represented to him 
the same: intuition and representation of the particular, whereby history is included into art 
as narration of the possible. Hence the definition of history as »intuition of the real«, which 
is the same as to assert in the same breath that history is art and yet that it is more than art. 
But if »descriptive science« is contradictio in adiecto, then so (following Collingwood) is the 
syntagm »intuition of the real«; for intuition, precisely because it is intuition and not thought, 
doesn’t know the difference between the real and the imaginary.
9 . Stuart Hughes, H istory as A rt and as Science, New York 1964. The first Yugoslave 
translation, alas, not until 1989: Istorija kao umjetnost i kao nauka, Gradina, Niš.
10. Ibid. Hughes says: »When writing his report, the historian must act like a dramatist. As he 
cannot be on several places at the same time (in this respect he is just a mortal), he must shift 
the happening from one place to another, whereby his own judgement and feeling tell him 
whereupon to focus his story.« In Hughes’ opinion,the narration goes on in two plans: in the 
first or in the big plan there’s everything that is later to remain as history (the main event,
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fact that Croce’s views (although only in a close circle of theoreticians) were 
finally accepted as an important stage on the way to recognition that there’s 
only one sort of judgment in history, and that judgment is of individual nature.
Croce’s theories began to be compared also with the French »critique de la 
science«, i.e., with the German views represented by Rickert. Most 
outstanding is the analysis of his criticism of positivism and materialism of his 
time, although also Croce, under the influence of Labriola, at first accepted 
historical materialism as a corrective of the one-sided comprehension of 
history. Later, however, he realized also that the very one-sidedness of this 
abstract doctrine -  as he said -  doesn’t grasp historical facts in their full 
concreteness. For Croce there’s no abstract Truth, but only concrete thinking; 
there’s no Good as such, but only ethical volition; no Beauty, but only poetical 
and artistic creation. The whole reality is nothing but spirituality in its ever 
changing-acti vity.11
According to this, Croce considers every true history to be at the same time a 
contemporary history, for it is born directly out of the activity performed by 
the mind as the consciousness of this activity. In other words, the real history 
arises directly out of life, which means that -  as self-reflection of the living 
mind -  it must vibrate in historian’s consciousness; in the opposite case, 
separated from the living document, what we get is only a chronicle. 
Proceeding from such a principle, which leads us to the thought that mind 
itself is history, its creator and as such the result of all preceding history, we 
can thus trace in Croce’s thought also the outlines of Voltaire’s comprehension 
of philosophy of history, for example, in his equation of history as insight into 
eternal contemporaneity with philosophy. What is by far the most important 
for the theory of historiography is that he reckoned among the organic works 
of »philosophy of mind« (»aesthetics«, »logics« and »philosophy of praxis«) 
also the »theory of historiography.« (Collingwood 1946)
Such a classification, of course, had to be based on the insight that history 
doesn’t consist of books or documents, but of interest and work living in the 
historian’s consciousness when criticizing and interpreting those documents. 
For Croce, the subject of history is therefore not past as such, but past about 
which we have a certain »historical evidence.«
Understandable. A great deal of the past is doubtlessly forever lost for us 
precisely for the reason that we have no documents to reconstruct it. We can, 
of course, believe that something we are told about by way of some 
undocumented testimony really happened, yet this is still no historical
the army general, the most furious battle), and in the second there’s the »huge anonymous 
acting and dying mass«.
11. About this Boris Furlan wrote already in his preface to the Slovene translation of Croce’s 
H istory o f Europe in the 19“" Century (Zgodovina Evrope v devetnajstem stoletju), 
published in 1934 (Hram, Ljubljana).
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knowledge, but only »chronicle.« Since a similar view can be traced already by 
Ranke, Croce’s novelty should be searched for in his questioning the 
difference between the »real« history and cronicle.
In his opinion, chronicle is a past in which we believe only on the basis of 
testifying; but chronicle is also every historical representation where the 
author cannot or does not know how to live through the experiences of the 
given agents of the past. From that we can draw the conclusion that mere 
recapitulation of sources, i.e., testimonies, isn’t history yet, but only chronicle. 
History is -  according to Croce -  based on the synthesis of two things: 
evidence and criticism. We can, though, speak of evidence only when it is used 
as evidence, i.e., interpreted on the basis of critical principles, whereas 
criticism can be recognized as such only when it is practically used in 
interpretation of evidence. In short, history becomes history when we revive 
(in the process of historical thinking) parts and aspects of the past when our 
present interest, i.e., view of the life we live in, plays a decisive role.
How this »reviving« or »re-experiencing« looks like in praxis becomes evident 
from the conclusion of the chapter »Pseudohistory,«12 where its author calls 
our attention to the fact that we can, »absorbed into research of a certain 
historical subject, see our sympathies and antipathies (our poetical history), 
our purposes in the realm of practical activity (our rhetorical history), our 
memories composed into a chronicle (our philological history) defiling in front 
of us one after another...«, and concludes the warning with the statement that 
deeper historical truth can be reached only when we (over and over again) 
successfully overcome in our mind all these forms one by one.13
When he later, on different occasions, keeps assuring us that real history can 
be distinguished from non-history only through this process of 
»self-overcoming,« then what we hear in the background is another, no less 
famous judgment of his where he compares the whole history of historiography
-  which he experiences as a most effective confirmation of historical errors -  
not perhaps with Caliban, but with the ever -oaning, crying, misleading and 
yet ever-escaping Ariel.14
The pleasure of this is double. First we enjoy his metaphorics, and second we 
enjoy the knowledge that his criticism doesn’t aim only at positivism and 
materialism, but also at pseudohistorical romanticism and poetical 
historiography, the authors of which, insisting on feelings and passions, do not 
reveal the past, but express merely their own feelings. Additional satisfaction 
for the reader represents the fact that in his criticism he demands that historian 
defend only what he is obliged to do on the basis of evidence and thus, 
consequently, argues for the severity of interpretation. Yet at the same time he
12. In Z u r Theorie und Geschichte der Historiographie.
13. Ibid., p. 39.
14. Ibid., p. 38.
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in no way denies the literary value of historical record. His writing is the best 
proof of it, but unfortunately it is also the reason for the fact that after literary 
theoreticians he was rediscovered for history again only by the adherents of 
contemporary narrative historiography. Even they discovered him by a 
roundabout way, through analytical reflection of different approaches to the 
relation between »to understand« and »to explain.«
*
From the chronological point of view, we should in this connection first 
mention the discussion pro and contra Carl G. Hempel’s work, The Function 
of General Laws in History (1942), where the author -  on the basis of a 
hypothetically-deductive model of explanation as the undergird of scientific 
historiography -  assures us that the dichotomy between these two modes of 
knowledge is unnecessary. Within this criticism we recognize, only 
conditionally, of course, two main orientations: the complex that creates the 
first one (hypothetically-deductive and probabilistic, genetic and 
functionalistic model and model of limited generalization, Nicholas Rescher, 
Carey B. Joynt), namely in its very essence doesn’t exceed the frame of the 
revision.
More freshness can be traced in Gardiner’s and Dray’s attempt to draw the 
language of historiography nearer to colloquial language15, the attempt Thath 
in a way proved also that the means for analyzing the historical language 
shouldn’t be limited to a single type or model. Gardiner was also the one who
-  with the help of Collingwood -  rejected the thesis on singularity of historical 
events and argued that explanation in historiography doesn’t »progress« from 
individual to general, but from general to individual. W.H. Dray in Laws and 
Explanation in History additionally radicalized his position by impugning his 
central thesis. According to it every historical explanation, although only 
implicitly, refers to one of the types of generalization -  with the claim that a 
historian should search out the characteristics of a certain historical happening, 
and not only state which general criteria this happening suits. Therefore, as he 
says, we must always -  for example when explaining the deeds of a certain 
agent in the past -  first reconstruct the way of thinking of the given time.
But no matter how sharp was Gardiner’s and Drey’s criticism of Hempel, it 
nevertheless still rested on his very position, that is to say, on the field of 
historiographical theory which -  although occupied mostly with analysis of 
explanation -  still contains certain recognizable features of Weber’s theory of 
»understanding«. We therefore had to wait for a serious alternative till the 
midst of sixties and seventies, when William B. Gallie and Arthur C. Danto 
started developing the so-called narrative theory of historiography; and it
15. Pietro Rossi, »Einleitung«, in Pietro Rossi, Theorie der modernen Geschichtssreibung, 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. 1987, p. 9.
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should be pointed out immediately that this time the break really signified a 
turning point in historiography. What happened was not only renaming of 
notions (explanation into narration), but also emphasizing the role of the 
so-called »documented narration«, which leaves the »unessential« 
understanding, in words of Paul Veyne, to the world of the living, to the world 
of reasons and ends...10
E xplanation as narration:
What is narrated (earlier we would have said »explained«) is from now on also 
comprehensible, since it is narratable; for the historian’s »practising« of 
understanding it therefore »suffices that a man is a man, which means, it 
suffices that he gives himself up.« Veyne adds that Dilthey would undoubtedly 
like to see also the humanities using such a way of understanding. But, as he 
states immediately afterward, it soon turns out that the humanities, not unlike 
»physical« sciences, as hypothetically-deductive systems, mostly care about a 
precise explanation.
History, however, is not supposed to explain in the sense of deducing and 
anticipating or foretelling. Its explanations shouldn’t signify a return to some 
principle in the light of which a certain event would become recognizable, but 
rather represent the »meaning assigned to the narration by the historian 
him self«17 (underlined by O.L.). Or as Danto would have said: historiography 
is essentially not explanation, but narration, narration that is explainable out 
of itself and as such capable of explaining the events it tells us about without 
searching for elements out of its own frame. And the reason every narration 
should be understandable and (implicitly) explainable is that it throws light 
upon the logical structure of a certain sequence of events. In his work 
Analitical philosophy o f history, Danto lays especially great stress on the 
so-called auto-explicative character of historical narration. In his opinion, the 
narrative form offers to the historian a kind of organizational scheme that has 
a similar function as theory of science. The main task of analitical philosophy 
of history is therefore to discern the logical structure of narration and throw 
light upon its difference from the logical structure of scientific research. He 
says: »Narrative statements don’t describe only a certain state or particular 
event, but a certain change and thus bring to light the consequences of 
individual events, as well as their causal connections with other events.«18 At 
the same time he was, like Gallie, convinced that presentation and 
introduction of narrative interpretation in historiography require the use of the 
instrumentarium of linguistic analysis.
This appeal was most evidently and nearly simultaneously responded to by 
Hayden White, one of the most outstanding representatives of the narrative
16. Paul Veyne, Geschichtsschreibung und was sie nicht ist, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. 1990, p. 72.
17. Ibid.
18. Pietro Rossi, »Einleitung«, p. 14.
202 Oto Luthar
»school« in the last fifteen years. We can realize this already when reading his 
early texts (1966) and finally with his book M etahistory19 (1973), where the 
author is seen to have entirely devoted himself to the research of 
historiographical narration and to have »decided« in favour of that kind of 
verbal structure of narrative discourse that refers to the insights of modern 
linguistics and semiology.
The structure conceived in this way doesn’t depend on the logical structure of 
discourse, but -  what we must always pay attention to -  on some kind of 
deeper cognitive level on the basis of which the historian makes his own 
decision concerning the strategy of explanation, type and mode of discourse, as 
well as his own »style«. It should be pointed out that White comprehends such 
a decision as poetical act, the joint of narration and explanation (which 
enabled us before the appearance of his theory to attribute the explicative 
character to the first one) is now substituted by persuasion that historiography 
is based upon poetical ground.
In this way, the historical narration is brought back again onto the narrative 
ground of discourse, and historiography -  as well as the philosophy of history, 
which White by all means tries to join to the historian’s sphere of work -  is 
justifiably obliged to different forms of explanation, all of them supposed to 
proceed from »poetical act«. In White’s opinion, the logical structure »extends 
to (touches) the préfiguration of a deeper level,« of the level on the basis of 
which the historian »creates« the actual subject of research, as well as of the 
level where basic linguistic decisions »fall«: he is sure that the logical structure 
is based on a kind of precognitive ground.20
Narrative historiography, which experienced its full bloom in the eighties, 
wants first of all to change or at least to lim it the structurally-historical, 
theoretical and analytical influence o f the sixties and seventies. Its principles, 
however, don’t announce expulsion of theory, as we are needlessly »warned« 
by some, but mostly want to establish a certain »tension between narration and 
theory«21. The growing interest in narration that we can trace in the last years 
therefore doesn’t tend towards any kind of restoration of narration from the 
period of romanticism, but speaks about a »vitally important cultural 
possibility«, i.e., about an »elementary, all-embracing speech act based on the 
time experience and brought up to the highest point of conscious organization 
of human life praxis.«22 The narration of today doesn’t aim only at
19. The entire title runs: Metahistory. The H istorical Imagination in N ineteenth Europe, Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1973.
20. Pietro Rossi, »Einleitung«, p. 16.
21. Jiirgen Kocka, Geschichte und Aufklärung, Vanđenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1988, p. 10.
22 . Ibid., p. 10-11. Also in: Jörn Rüsen, Wie kann man Geschichte vernünftig schreiben? Über 
das Verhältnis von Narrativität und Theoriegebrauch in der Geschichtswissenschaft«, in: 
Jürgen Kocka, Thomas Nipperday (eds.), Theorie und Erzählung in der Geschichte, München 
1979.
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representation of the actual state, but searches backward into the very 
processes of research.
In regard to this, the »discoursive argumentation«, or any other »use of 
theory,« can also be reckoned among narration; it has only to refer -  in one 
way or the other -  to the »time changes of human reality« or to »the need for 
orientation within the contemporary world of life« (Lebenswelt, J.Rusen 
1988).23 This is the only way how to handle the tension between theory and 
narration, i.e., between analytical and narrative historiography. What is 
especially important is that in this way narration becomes a synonym for 
dealing with reality -  it is no more just one of the many special ways of how to 
treat history (S. Quandt),24 but a constitutive principle of historical science in 
general, without any anti-theoretical and anti-structuralist prickle.
All these expressions are concerned with a kind of »time differentiation and 
specification of what happened in the past« which (following Quandt and 
Süssmuth) proceeds from a certain »temporality of language« where »time 
theory« is substituted by language of time.23 If we understand historical 
narration as constitutional principle, then we must also explain the meaning of 
this for the representation of historical knowledge. We also must -  when 
taking over the principle of representation -  ask after the constitutional 
principle of historical knowledge. On the basis of this we then realize that the 
fundamental questions of contemporary theoretical discussion in 
historiography have to deal with the relation of representation and constitution 
and not only -  like it used to be -  with the question of the form of historical 
representation. But before we can actually force our way through with such 
principles, the historical science must (as Theodor Schider tells us) overcome 
its »solipsistic tendencies«. Overgrow its so called scientific »self-reflectivity« 
and (besides the gossip, thing itself and narrator) sistematically draw into the 
»narrative discussion« also the listener. His relevance system and his system of 
processing, as well as the »narrative environment« itself.20 Because this is the 
only way how to come to a consistent narrative expression which includes -  
besides the problems of representation -  also the problems of intermediation. 
The narration thus shouldn’t be understood only as a »temporal structure o f 
text and argumentation« (H. M. Baumgartner), but as a »basic and urgent
23 . Ibid
24 . See: Siegfried Quandt, Bernd Mütter, Historie -  D idaktik -  Komunikation. Wissenschaftsg­
eschichte und aktuelle Herausforderungen. Geschichte, Grundlagen und Hintergründe, 
Hitzenroth, Marburg 1988, as well as: Siegfried Quandt, Hans Süssmuth, Historische 
Erzählung, collection of essays, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1982.
25 . S. Quandt, H. Süssmuth, Historische Erzählung..., p. 8.
26 . Theodor Schieder, »Einleitung«, in: Kurt Gräubig, Theodor Schieder (eds.), Theorieprobleme 
der Geschichtswissenschaft, Darmstadt 1977, p. XI; the beginnings can be traced already in: 
Theodor Schieder, Geschichte als Wissenschaft, Oldenbourg -  München -  Wien, 2'“1 remade 
ed. from 1968.
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form o f representation (and intermediation, added by O.L.) o f the past reality, 
proceeding from  the basic human existential need«?7
A similar, though less sophisticated, conclusion also has been reached, as 
already mentioned, by Paul Veyne. We should also pay attention to the 
findings of Lawrence Stone -  only that he based his striving for return to the 
narrative form of historical representation mostly on the critical survey of 
Marxist, »demographic« (the Annales schoool) and »cliometrical« (North 
American) model. We should, of course, know that the so-called »return to 
narration« has a somewhat different meaning with the »historians« Veyne, 
Stone, P.Burke or C. Ginzburg, as it does in case of the philosophically- 
-oriented authors like Gallie, Danto or White.
The former speak in favour of the narrative theory because they see in it the 
most adequate form for representation of historical work, while the latter see 
in the badly needed return to narration mostly an alternative to the 
»programmes of scientification« (Verwissenschaftlichung) of historiography -  
an alternative to the historical science subjected to general theory of society 
and to the historiography based on expressive and narrative schemes liable to 
social sciences.
Translated by Seta Knop
27 . Jürgen Kocka, Geschichte und Aufklärung, p. 10. See also: Hans Michael Baumgartner, Jörn 
Rüsen, Sem inar Geschichte und Theorie. Umrisse einer H istorik, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. 
1976, p. 17-58, and especially the work of Werner Schiffer, Theorien der Geschichts­
schreibung und ihre erzähltheoretische Relevanz, J. B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 
Stuttgart 1980, p. 23-84.
